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Proponents of measures to make independent section 527 organizations into “political commit-
tees” under the Federal Election Campaign Act, subjecting the organizations to federal campaign
limits and reporting requirements, misunderstand both the role and result of regulation in cam-
paigns and the jurisprudence in this area.
Such measures would leave much activity unregulated and would induce a shift of activity from
one legal structure to another, thus rendering any perceived partisan advantage arising from the
measures improbable or incalculable.
Organizations engaged in independent speech and association with no connection to candidates
or officeholders cannot be made to register with the Federal Election Commission simply because
they mention candidates; and they cannot be limited in the financial contributions they may receive
for their independent communications. Independent organizations do not corrupt the legislative
process. They are not corrupting the balloting process. They are a part of, not corrupters of, the
information exchange process in and around elections.
That politicians and party chairmen on both sides of the aisle favor restricting the speech of inde-
pendent organizations on vaguely egalitarian grounds ignores the Supreme Court’s clear instruc-
tion that limiting the voice of some to enhance the relative voice of others is foreign to the First
Amendment. The instrumental value of this maxim is backed by data. Studies show that more
speech in campaigns, not less, benefits voters of all socio-economic backgrounds. 
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 Introduction1 
At present there are proposals in the Senate and a companion measure in the House 
to “ban 527s,” which is tantamount to requiring independent organizations registered under 
section 527 of the Internal Revenue code to register as political committees under the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”).  Under section 527, a political organization is not 
subject to taxation on its exempt function income.2  “Exempt function” is defined as “the 
function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or 
appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a 
political organization.”3  Exempt function income includes campaign contributions and 
membership dues.4 
 
In 1971 Congress created the “political committee” under FECA.  In 1975 Congress 
created section 527 to allow multi-purpose tax-exempt organizations to characterize much of 
their prior activity as “political activity” subject to a favorable tax treatment.  The IRS knew 
that certain 501(c) organizations—(c)(4) (social advocacy organizations), (c)(5) (labor unions), 
and (c)(6) (trade associations)—were engaged in a combination of social welfare, advocacy, and 
political activities, but Congress anticipated that 
 
a section 501c organization that is permitted to engage in political activities 
would establish a separate organization that would operate primarily as a 
political organization and directly receive or disburse all funds related to 
[political] activities.  In this way, the campaign-type activities would be taken 
entirely out of the section 501(c) organization, to the benefit of both the 
organization and the administration of the tax laws.5 
 
Thus, the federal government drove mixed-purpose organizations into apparently single-
purpose operations, although the overarching organizations continued to perform multiple 
functions.  In 2000 Congress required the 527-arms of such organizations to report their 
activity in detail as a condition of keeping their privileged tax treatment.6  In 2002 Congress 
made it much more difficult for political party committees and others to finance their 
operations.  In 2006 it appears Congress stands ready to make it nearly impossible for the 
independent organizations that made full use of the section 527 haven Congress created to 
speak about politics.  But in doing so, Congress seems to ignore the legitimate bases for such 
regulation, which are: preventing the corruption of officeholders (or its appearance) by large 
contributions; prohibiting spending of corporate and union treasury funds in connection 
with federal elections; and preventing circumvention of the limits designed to prevent that 
corruption. 
 
BCRA Cut the Link to Officeholders 
 
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)7 cut the link between federal 
officeholders and non-federal funds or “soft money” by prohibiting officeholders from 
soliciting, directing, or spending soft money, or establishing, financing, maintaining, or 
controlling any entities that deal in soft money.8  BCRA forced the national party committees 
to renounce 60 percent of their funding, and to finance all their activities, both federal and 
non-federal, with federal dollars (“hard money”).  BCRA also placed strict limits on state and 
local political parties in federal election years, including requiring them to fund their get-out-
the-vote, voter registration, voter identification, and generic campaign activities with federally 
regulated money.  The rationale was to prevent the appearance of corruption that results from 
large contributions going to officeholders or that reach officeholders via the political party 
committees to which those officeholders belong.  BCRA also imposed restrictions on 
 3
independent, issue advocacy by unions, corporations, and incorporated non-profit advocacy 
organizations, trade associations and section 527 organizations, preventing those 
organizations from paying for any communication that names a federal candidate within 30 
days of a primary, caucus, or convention or 60 days of a general election.  “Congress found 
that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual torrent of televised 
election-related ads during the periods immediately preceding federal elections [30 days 
preceding a primary, convention, or caucus or 60 days preceding a general election], and that 
remedial legislation was needed to staunch that flow of money.”9  
 
 The law also decreed spending made in coordination with a political party10 to be a 
federally regulable contribution capable of making the organization paying for the activity a 
federal political committee, subject to the full panoply of restrictions and reporting 
requirements.  Thus, BCRA cut completely the link between officeholders and soft money. 
 
 But BCRA did not “ban soft money,” as reform organizations like to say. The concept 
“soft money” is not so much a quantifiable entity as the inverse of a quantifiable entity.  “Soft 
money” is merely money not regulated by the Federal Election Commission.  Attempting to 
“ban soft money” is like attempting to “ban darkness.”  The question in the first case is where 
else to apply federal regulation, just as the question in the second is where to shine additional 
light. 
   
The actions of section 527 organizations in the 2004 election cycle did not 
“circumvent” the limits of BCRA, as many have alleged.  First, BCRA cut the soft-money tie to 
federal officeholders by prohibiting soft money solicitations and banning soft money 
donations to the national party committees to which the officeholders belong.  The 527 
organizations of 2004 were not party committees and had no officeholders as members.  The 
527s had no ties to the party committees to which those officeholders belong; if they had, they 
would have been captured under BCRA.  Consequently, the 527s did not “circumvent” the 
soft money ban, which applies only to national parties or their affiliates, or other entities 
controlled by federal officeholders. 
 
Second, BCRA did not limit the independent speech of independent entities, because 
it could not do so constitutionally.  American law countenances no limits on independent 
advocacy (outside of a voluntary limit compensated by public financing).  But there are 
funding source prohibitions.  Even BCRA’s electioneering communication provisions—a 
source prohibition—only redrew the election-related line to within 30 days of a primary, 
caucus, or convention or 60 days of a general election for advertising that mentions 
candidates and is paid for with union or corporate treasury funds.  The activity of section 527 
organizations in the 2004 cycle—that is, advocacy by entities wholly detached from 
officeholders and made outside of the time restraints contained in BCRA—were not a 
“circumvention” of BCRA in any meaningful sense of the term. 
 
Proposals to convert the remaining 527 organizations into FECA regulated political 
committees have nothing to do with limiting the flow of money to candidates or parties, or 
deterring any other corruption the courts have ever recognized.  Rather, the 527 ban strips 
wholly independent organizations of their right to full-throated advocacy under the First 
Amendment in a ham-fisted attempt to restore the storied role of America’s political parties in 
our democratic system, an attempt to put the BCRA genie back in the bottle.  
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Some Features of the 527 Proposal 
 
The proposals would compel most non-federal section 527 organizations—whether 
they are independent, affiliated groups or the separate funds of section 501(c) organizations—
to operate instead as federal political committees, subjecting them to all of FECA’s hard 
money, registration, and reporting requirements.  The measures would declare every 
organization described in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code a federal PAC, unless it 
fits within one of several narrow exceptions.  And any excepted 527 organization loses its 
exception if it spends more than $1000 during any calendar year on either a public 
communication that “promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes” a clearly identified candidate 
at any time during the year before a general election or engages in “voter drive activity” 
(partisan or non-partisan voter registration, voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or 
generic campaign activity).  The measures also limit donations to the non-federal account of 
any applicable organization—used for purely non-federal activities—to $25,000 per year from 
individuals. 
 
 
Partisan Advantage is Improbable or Incalculable 
 
There is no denying that measures are being considered and rejected due to perceived partisan 
advantage in regulating the activities of 527s.11  But that apparent partisan advantage is 
largely overstated and is lessening as both sides of the political aisle adapt to the changing 
legal landscape.  Before passage of BCRA the speculation was that the Democratic party 
would be unable to match the Republicans in hard dollar fundraising but had a clear 
advantage in raising soft money.  The first proved to be less true than imagined, although in 
“2004 the three Republican Party committees—RNC, NRSC, and NRCC—outraised the 
comparable Democratic Party committees $898 million to $679 million in hard money 
receipts.”12  And in the soft money comparison, seven of the ten largest 527s in 2004 were pro-
Democrat.13  The Republicans got a late start in the 527 fundraising game, waiting as late as 
May of 2004, by some accounts, to fully engage,14 but once fully engaged they were besieged 
with donations from donors at all income levels. 
 
 
Countering the advantage on the ground 
 
The advantage the Republican Party enjoyed in the 2004 election cycle was its ground 
game operation; that is, its ability to mobilize voters through the use of an improved system 
of data mining, micro targeting, and voter file enhancement that allowed the Republican 
Party to know the issues that moved voters and whether those voters were inclined to vote 
Democrat or Republican.15  Weeks ago, however, the Washington Post reported that Democrats 
are making inroads on the technological front.16  George Soros and Harold Ickes have started 
a for-profit company designed to enhance lists for Democratic voters.17  They intend to sell the 
lists to existing organizations that might use them on election day—an operation that will not 
be captured by a 527 ban and could cumulatively eclipse the nearly $200 million hard money 
advantage Republicans enjoyed in the 2004 cycle.  The data could be purchased by 
organizations whose respective “major purposes” (a constitutional requirement for 
registration as a political committee) were determined long ago—organizations such as 
section 501(c)(5) labor unions and left-leaning 501(c)(4) advocacy organizations—groups the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) would never call political committees. The Post notes that 
the Ickes and Soros activity is a no-confidence vote in the efforts of the DNC and its chairman 
Howard Dean.18  But their activity is more likely a no-confidence vote in the current campaign 
finance system that starved the national party committees of as much as 60 percent of their 
previous resources.  Democratic data mining has moved offshore and has not been placed in a 
section 527 organization.  That the news story mentioned a potential rift between Soros and 
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Ickes, on one hand, and the DNC and Dean, on the other, serves only to show that the two 
entities are not coordinating their efforts and working in tandem. Coordination would place 
the activity squarely within BCRA. 
 
Activity the measures leave behind 
 
Data mining is not the only activity left-leaning individuals and organizations can 
perform outside the strictures of a 527 ban or BCRA.  There is no reason the private efforts of 
George Soros—or Peter Lewis, or Steve Bing—would have to stop at data mining.  Political 
activity of any kind could be financed in their individual capacities after a 527 ban becomes 
law, and if past practice is any indication, they will have no qualms about doing so.  
 
Nothing stops 501(c)(3) organizations from engaging in “nonpartisan” voter 
registration activity, even though such activity can easily be skewed to influence one party or 
another—registering voters in Cleveland rather than Cincinnati, for example, or Marin County 
but not Orange County.19  And the left has multiple coalitions and union members that tend 
to favor the Democratic Party and have proven willing in the past to get involved or to 
volunteer time. 
 
Tax exempt organizations under 501(c)(4) (social advocacy) may spend for election-
related activity without jeopardizing their tax exempt status provided such activity is not their 
primary purpose or activity.20  Unless section 501(c)(4) organizations are added to the 527 
proposal—a highly dubious proposition, constitutionally—social advocacy organizations such 
as the Sierra Club, Children’s Defense Fund, Earth First, NOW, and NARAL may register and 
identify left-leaning voters, may conduct get-out-the-vote activities, and may even run 
broadcast advertising naming candidates, so long as they avoid the electioneering 
communication restrictions of BCRA.  Well-established advocacy organizations should have 
no trouble proving first that their respective primary purposes are not to intervene in politics, 
and, second, that more than half of their activity over the years has been for genuine advocacy 
of left-leaning causes.  Because many 501(c)(4) organizations currently make use of a 527 arm, 
they are well poised to shift much activity into the (c)(4) with little effort were a section 527 
measure to pass Congress and be signed into law.  Established advocacy groups would have a 
marked advantage over newly minted organizations as the rule on election-related activity is 
essentially that the organization must be able to show more than $1 of advocacy activity for 
every dollar of election-related activity. There are established (c)(4) organizations that can 
engage on the right as well, such as National Right to Life, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
and the National Rifle Association, which has between 3 and 4 million members.21 
 
Section 501(c)(5) organizations (labor unions) will also be able to spend nearly half of 
their resources in election-related activity to the general public, unless, of course, Republicans 
add labor unions to the 527 proposal.  Labor unions claim 12 to 13 percent of wage and 
salaried workers nationwide—nearly ten times the size of the NRA—with nearly 30 million 
members.22  Because unions have the well-established primary purpose of collective bargaining 
they should be able to get out the vote, identify and register voters, run phone banks to the 
general public, engage in direct mail campaigns, and run broadcast advertising naming 
candidates outside the electioneering provisions of BCRA with little concern of running afoul 
of the Internal Revenue Service. 
 
There is also the “membership exception” to federal campaign law,23 not excluded in 
proposals to regulate 527s, which allows corporations to make communications to their 
executives and allows unions to make communications to their members on any subject, 
including express advocacy.  Messages can be coordinated with candidates.24  
Communications can include printed materials, candidate appearances before the members, 
operation of phone banks to tell members to register and vote for a particular candidate, even 
member-focused registration and get-out-the-vote drives.25 
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Hampering and enhancing relative voices 
 
Republicans also seem to believe that sidelining large donors on both sides of the aisle 
will keep the Democratic message, carried by the Media Fund and other organizations in the 
2004 cycle, off the air.  Thus, they would extend BCRA’s ban on corporate or union-paid 
advertising within 30 or 60 days of an election to 365 days per year for section 527 
organizations, and include advertising paid with funds from individuals, not just 
corporations or unions. 
 
Like all campaign finance regulation measures, a 527 ban tends to protect incumbents. 
That is why Congress may pass it:  Congress is, after all, a collection of incumbents.26  But 
Republicans seem to be missing the fact that 2008 will be the first presidential contest in decades 
devoid of incumbents.  And looking at the two major parties vying for office in the 2008 cycle, the 
Democratic frontrunners for president exhibit the features of incumbent politicians more than do 
the Republican counterparts.  Who is going to correct the record when the campaigns of 
Democratic officeholders begin?  James Q. Wilson has cited a study by the Center for Media and 
Public Affairs (CMPA) demonstrating that, especially during the month before the election, 
Senator John Kerry received more favorable mentions than any presidential candidate in the 
history of CMPA’s twenty-five year study of television broadcasting.27  “Since 1980 (and setting 
aside the advent of Fox News), the Democratic candidate has received more favorable mentions 
than the Republican candidate in every race except the 1988 contest between Michael Dukakis 
and George H.W. Bush.  A similarly clear orientation characterizes weekly newsmagazines like 
Time and Newsweek.”28  Peggy Noonan has opined that the Democratic frontrunner will have half 
of the mainstream media behind her, making it difficult for much of the other half to be against 
her.29  There will be practical limits on the ability of the Republican Party to run advertising to 
correct the record because it is as likely as not that the Republican nominee for president will ask—
or will be forced by the press to ask—that his party take the high road and keep critiques to a 
minimum.  Other established Republican organizations may find themselves in a similar position.  
 
But quite apart from the potential for 527 messaging to help the Republicans in the 
future, it helped the Republicans in 2004.  Recall the Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for Truth, 
which challenged John Kerry’s account of his service record during the Viet Nam War.  Under 
federal communications law, a broadcast station cannot refuse to run a candidate’s ad even if the 
broadcaster believes the ad is misleading or false.30  (There are valid reasons for this.)  Yet, a 
broadcast station is under no obligation to run an ad by a 527 organization that is false or 
misleading.  527 advertising, therefore, must be truthful; it can correct a candidate’s record in 
public advertising; and it is a necessary and vital part of informing voters about the veracity of 
candidate assertions.  There is no reason to believe this task should be left to the media, or that the 
media will hear about the story without advertising, or would run the story if they heard about it 
in the absence of advertising.  Indeed, the Swift Vets held a press conference that went unattended; 
and they garnered little notice until they took to the airwaves. 
 
 
 
Democratic dictum is equally disturbing 
 
The apparent gaming of the political system is not one sided.  Democrats are 
countering the Republican call for a 527 ban by advocating the full public funding of Senate 
and House races, thereby erasing the Republicans’ hard money advantage.31  Both the 
Republican 527 ban and the Democrats’ push for full public financing, however, seek, 
ultimately, to cut independent speakers and citizens out of the process.  The Republicans’ 
plan would do so today; the Democrats’ plan would do so tomorrow.  
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Opposing candidates are not the only forces that candidates must respond to when 
attempting to win or keep political office.  Systems of full public financing only forestall the 
question of how to restrict the efforts of independent actors32 that Republicans seem willing to “fix” 
in the current round of 527 measures.  Indeed, the 2004 presidential contest was publicly funded.  
Most advocates for public financing presume, erroneously, that the desire of a candidate to respond 
with advertising comes only from an opponent.  But a wealthy individual might run an independent 
ad campaign that would force a publicly funded candidate to react.  A PAC could make an 
independent expenditure; a non-profit organization enjoying the MCFL exemption33 could do the 
same; or a newspaper or broadcast outlet could run a news program or editorial that would force the 
candidate to respond.  Some or all of those entities, including press entities, would have to be limited 
in their spending (or candidates highly subsidized) for full public financing to work to “level the 
playing field”—and some academics have suggested regulating the press and media for just this 
purpose.34  While past restrictions in the campaign finance area depended on a link between the 
activity restricted and the officeholder, the rationale behind the Republicans’ 527 ban and the 
Democrats’ call for full public financing would stretch the notion of such a link to anyone an 
officeholder felt a need to respond to with advertising.  There is no existing constitutional precedent 
that would not be altered or abandoned to make way for such measures.  Put simply, limiting the 
speech of independent speakers lacks a compelling basis and is unconstitutional. 
 
 
Limiting the Speech of Independent Speakers Is  
Unwise and Unconstitutional 
 
Forcing PACs on citizens is a matter for courts, not just Congress 
 
To constitutionally regulate campaign finance, the government must demonstrate 
that the “harms it recites are real,” not “mere speculation or conjecture.”35  Proposals to 
subject section 527 organizations to political committee status, with scant regard to their 
activities, effectively impose an “any purpose” test in brazen disregard of the “major purpose” 
test the Supreme Court established in Buckley v. Valeo. Such proposals presume that any 
communication mentioning a candidate that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes that 
candidate at any time of the year—or any “voter drive activity,” even if totally non-partisan—is 
sufficient to trigger political committee status.  If such proposals were in effect during the last 
cycle, any mention of President Bush’s or Senator Kerry’s policies from November 2, 2003 to 
November 2, 2004, or any attempt to identify voters, would have turned the 527 organization 
into a federal political committee.  In FEC v. Beaumont, the Court noted that a non-profit 
corporation entitled to the MCFL exemption of federal campaign law—which exempts certain 
non-profit corporations from FECA’s registration requirement—would have to register as a 
political committee to make contributions to federal candidates,36 though it would not have 
to register to make independent expenditures.  The direct nexus to a federal candidate and the 
entity’s enjoyment of the corporate form were ample reason to require it to register.37  There is 
no such connection here, however, or existing 527 organizations would already be covered. 
 
Establishing and maintaining a PAC, however, is not a minor administrative task, and 
it has become more onerous with each new round of restrictions on PACs and those who run 
them.  Gone will be the ability of citizens to adapt quickly and associate freely in support of a 
position when issues arise.  The various funding source, amount, and disclosure requirements 
of PAC compliance make it difficult to raise the quantities of money for broadcast 
communications.  New or small organizations may have a hard time, given the limited 
number of employees or members from whom they can solicit at all: not just anyone may 
contribute to a PAC; you have to belong to the organization, or work for the company or 
union that sponsors it.  That has practical consequences of which courts are aware.  The Swift 
Vets’ communications would have been impossible, for example, without the modest seed 
money that would become illegal under current 527 proposals.  Or if the PAC were wildly 
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successful, however unlikely, it would come at the expense of other right-leaning PACs or 
party committees, all of which rely on individual contributors bound by biennial aggregate 
limits on their contributions to all political committees during an election cycle.  In other 
words, the question of who will join your PAC in time to raise enough funds at a maximum of 
$5000 per person for advertising is a very real constraint on an organization’s ability to run 
advertising—independent advertising, no less. 
 
Independent voices can’t be limited 
 
Forcing political committee status on the organizations is only one question in 
assessing constitutionality.  The “key question is whether individual contributions to any 
political committee—527 or not—that does not make contributions to a candidate but instead 
makes only expenditures can be subject to limitation.”38 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court 
stated that the First Amendment permits the government to regulate campaign spending to 
prevent the corruption of officeholders or its appearance.  The Court has not recognized any 
interest in “equalizing” speech. Contributions and funds spent in coordination with a 
candidate can be limited to protect against legislative quid pro quos. 39  The Court has also 
said that contributions to an organization that in turn makes both contributions and 
independent expenditures (defined constitutionally as "express advocacy") can also be limited 
to make regulatory oversight feasible; to prevent the possibility that unlimited funds would 
flow to candidates. But independent spending lacks the necessary connection to officeholders, 
is not corrupting, and cannot be limited.  The “absence of prearrangement and coordination 
of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the 
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a 
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”40  Independent spending is not 
corrupting.41  Likewise, contributions to organizations that engage in independent spending 
are also not corrupting.  The Court has already granted constitutional protection to an 
individual’s independent spending.  George Soros may buy all the advertising he wants.  That 
right extends also to an individual’s donation to an organization that engages in independent 
spending.  “The independent expenditure ceiling fails to serve any substantial governmental 
interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process … and 
‘“heavily burdens core First Amendment protection.’”42 
 
As stated by Professor Richard Briffault, “[t]wo Supreme Court decisions provide support 
for the argument that if an independent expenditure does not present a danger of corrupting or 
appearing to corrupt officeholders, then contributions to a political committee that makes only 
independent expenditures cannot be limited.”43  The first case is California Medical Ass’n v. FEC, a case 
involving limits on contributions by a trade association to its own PAC.  In the plurality was Justice 
Blackmun, who wrote in concurrence that although the limit on contributions to a political 
committee is valid “as a means of preventing evasion of the limitations on contributions to a 
candidate[,] … a different result would follow [if the limit] were applied to donations to a political 
[organization] established for the purpose of making independent expenditures, rather than 
contributions,” because “a committee that makes only independent expenditures … poses no threat” 
of corruption.44  Professor John Eastman has noted that contributions to a committee that does not 
give to candidates, such as most section 527 organizations contemplated by current proposals, are 
deserving of even more constitutional protection because “the principal message expressed by a 
contribution to a noncandidate committee is agreement with and furtherance of that committee’s 
views,” unlike the message expressed by contributions to a candidate committee or a committee that 
in turn gives to candidates.  This approach is bolstered by the second case, Citizens Against Rent 
Control, which invalidated a contribution limit to a ballot proposition committee because the lack of 
a nexus to a candidate made corruption inapplicable.45  Similarly, where the nexus to an officeholder 
is not present, the anti-circumvention rationale of McConnell is also not furthered by a limit on 
contributions to organizations that engage in wholly independent activity.46 
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Even though the contribution limit applies to the independent spending of political 
committees that also contribute to candidates or make coordinated expenditures, it is not 
clear that the Court would approve limits on organizations that engage in wholly 
independent activity.   As noted by Professor Briffault, the McConnell Court’s treatment of this 
issue related to BCRA’s application of contribution limits to the activities of political 
parties.”47  But the section 527 organizations Congress appears interested in and political 
party committees are not alike.  “[F]ederal candidates and officeholders enjoy a special 
relationship and unity of interest” with their political party, said the McConnell Court.48  “The 
national committees of the two major parties are both run by, and largely composed of, 
federal officeholders and candidates.”49  The “close connection and alignment of interests” 
between candidates and their political parties means that “large soft-money contributions to 
national parties are likely to create the actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of federal 
officeholders, regardless of how those funds are ultimately spent,”50 and the same is true of 
“the close ties between federal candidates and state party committees.”51 
 
 The same cannot be said of 527 organizations.  There is no record that candidates or party 
committees coordinated their spending with the 527s.  Section 527 organizations simply have no 
comparable ties to candidates, thus making the anti-circumvention rationale of McConnell far too 
tenuous and unsuitable.  Spending by section 527 organizations does not corrupt the legislative 
process because there is no nexus to lawmakers. It does not corrupt the balloting process.  And 
spending by section 527 organizations does not corrupt the process of information exchange in 
the run up to the election.  Indeed, spending by section 527 organizations is an integral part of the 
process of information exchange.  And the information exchange needs to be open, robust and 
uninhibited. 
 
More speech is what is needed, not less 
 
Studies indicate that campaign spending diminishes neither trust nor involvement by 
citizens in elections.  Indeed, spending increases public knowledge of candidates among all groups 
in the population. “Higher campaign spending produces more knowledge about candidates,” 
whether measured by name identification, association of candidates with issues, or ideology; and 
setting a cap on spending would likely produce a less informed electorate.52  Unlimited spending 
does not confuse the public,53 and the benefits of campaign spending are broadly dispersed across 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups alike.  That is, as incumbents are challenged by spending, 
both advantaged and disadvantaged groups gain in knowledge.54  And so-called negative 
advertising campaigns do not demobilize the public, as many have alleged.55 
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Razing speech to the same level 
 
Yet many persons inside the beltway believe that 527s should be regulated on 
egalitarian grounds.  Republican Party chairman Ken Mehlman is outspoken in support of 
527 regulation, declaring that Congress “must reform 527s, so that everyone plays at the same 
level, and billionaires can’t once again use loopholes to try to buy elections.”56  Democratic 
Party chairman Howard Dean signed expenditure limit legislation as Governor of Vermont 
and had the DNC file an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in support of the legislation.57  
Senator John McCain “said that lawmakers should support the bill out of self-interest, 
because it would prevent a rich activist from trying to defeat an incumbent by diverting 
money into a political race through a 527 organization.  ‘That should alarm every federally 
elected Member of Congress,’ he said.”58  Senator Trent Lott has called for limits on 527s to 
“level the playing field.”59  That these candidates and party chairs notice the spending and how 
it may benefit or hurt them is also a tenuous justification for regulation.  Dissenting in 
McConnell, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote that benefit—even benefit expressed in 
gratitude—is not enough to justify restrictions, otherwise this rationale could serve as a basis 
to regulate “editorials and political talk shows [that] benefit federal candidates and 
officeholders every bit as much as a generic voter registration drive conducted by a state 
party,”60 a position adopted by the McConnell majority.61  Preventing circumvention of 
applicable contribution limits and source prohibitions was the rationale employed by the 
Court in McConnell.  The rationale was not to foster egalitarianism.62 
 
Buckley long ago rejected the argument that “equalizing the relative ability of 
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections”63 is a compelling interest, 
adding that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”64  The Court has said elsewhere that trying to manipulate groups’ relative 
ability to speak “is a decidedly fatal objective.”65  And there is good reason to be suspicious of 
the motives of incumbent legislators and party chairmen seeking egalitarianism in campaign 
spending.  After a certain level of spending, the utility of further spending declines, and 
incumbents hit the point of marginal utility earlier than opponents.66  Political free trade is 
both the norm and normative prescription for a healthy and constitutional political system in 
America.  And “[p]olitical ‘free trade’ does not necessarily require that all who participate in 
the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.”67  
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